City of Orem v. Ko-Tung Lee : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
City of Orem v. Ko-Tung Lee : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Don McCandless; Counsel for Appellee.
Linda Anderson; Anderson and Dredge; Counsel for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Orem v. Lee, No. 920207 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3119
oarssiKir-
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
5G 
A10 
DOCKET NO. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF OREM, 
Plaintiff-APPELLEE 
vs. 
KO-TUNG LEE, 
Defendant-APPELLANT 
CASE NOS. 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
920207 - CA 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT 
OREM DEPARTMENT 
921000023 
BRIEF OP DEFENDANT - APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF RETAIL THEFT, 
A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, OREM DEPARTMENT, 
IN AND FOR THE CITY OF OREM, UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE JOSEPH DIMICK, PRESIDING 
ARGUMENT PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION NUMBER 2 
"APPEALS FROM CONVICTIONS IN ALL OTHER CRIMINAL MATTERS" 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, RULE 29 
DON McCANDLESS 
Counsel for Appellee 
OREM CITY PROSECUTOR 
97 East Center 
Orem, Utah 84057 
LINDA ANDERSON 
Counsel for Appellant 
ANDERSON & DREDGE, 
Attorneys at Law PC 
2230 North University 
Parkway, Suite 9-F 
Provo, Utah 84604 
(801) 375-7678 Pi 
JUL 131992, 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF OREM, 
Plaintiff-APPELLEE 
vs. 
KO-TUNG LEE, 
Defendant-APPELLANT 
CASE NOS. 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
920207 - CA 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT 
OREM DEPARTMENT 
921000023 
BRIEF OP DEPENDANT - APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF RETAIL THEFT, 
A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, OREM DEPARTMENT, 
IN AND FOR THE CITY OF OREM, UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE JOSEPH DIMICK, PRESIDING 
ARGUMENT PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION NUMBER 2 
"APPEALS FROM CONVICTIONS IN ALL OTHER CRIMINAL MATTERS" 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, RULE 29 
DON McCANDLESS 
Counsel for Appellee 
OREM CITY PROSECUTOR 
97 East Center 
Orera, Utah 84057 
LINDA ANDERSON 
Counsel for Appellant 
ANDERSON & DREDGE, 
Attorneys at Law PC 
2230 North University 
Parkway, Suite 9-F 
Provo, Utah 84604 
(801) 375-7678 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 2 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 3 
RELEVANT FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 6 
I. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE GUILTY VERDICT 6 
A. Applying the Standard of Review for Marshalling of the 
Evidence in the Light Most Favorable to the Verdict, 
the Prosecution Failed to Establish Defendant's Guilt 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
B. The City of Orem Failed to Satisfy the Requirement that 
the Crime be Proven Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Because 
the City Has Never Shown by Investigating the Store's 
Videotape Inventory that the Videotapes Were Stolen . 9 
II. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED SIGNIFICANT RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY 
BOTH THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE UTAH STATE 
CONSTITUTION 11 
A. The Trial Court Denied Defendant His Rights to 
Confrontation, Effective Assistance of Counsel and Due 
Process of Law Guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah State 
Constitution by Not Providing Defendant an 
Interpreter 11 
B. Defendant was Prejudiced in His Defense by the Lack of 
an Interpreter Robbing Him of His Right to Assist in 
His Own Defense and To Understand the Procedure in 
Which He was Involved 17 
I 
Ill- DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN HIS REPRESENTATION OF 
THE DEFENDANT 19 
A. Defense Counsel Never Filed Motions or Challenged by 
Objection the Propriety of Defendant's Detention by 
Those in Authority at the Site of the Alleged 
Offense 19 
B. Defense Counsel Failed to Request a Translator for 
Defendant, Thus Depriving Defendant of a Fair Trial 25 
C. Defense Counsel Fciiled to Make Adequate Objections to 
Admissions of Evidence 25 
D. Defense Counsel Failed to Admit Critical Evidence 
Supporting Defendant's Case and Establishing a 
Defense 27 
E. The Oversights and Omissions Referred to are Critical 
and Determinative 27 
CONCLUSION 28 
APPENDIX A: A 
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes A 
Constitution of United States Al 
Amendment IV Al 
Amendment V * Al 
Amendment VI Al 
Amendment XIV Al 
Constitution of Utah A2 
Article I; Section 7 A2 
Article I; Section 12 A2 
Article I; Section 14 A2 
Utah Code Annotated A2 
76-1-501 A2 
76-6-602 A3 
76-6-603 A3 
ii 
77-1-6 A4 
78-2a-3(2) (d) A4 
Utah Rules of Evidence A5 
Rule 401 A5 
Rule 402 A5 
Rule 602 A5 
Rule 901(a) A5 
APPENDIX B COURT RECORDS B 
MINUTE ENTRY dated 1-2-92 Bl 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL 
RANDY M. LISH B2 
NOTICE OF SETTING dated 1-24-92 B3 
LOG SHEET/MINUTE ENTRY dated 2-10-92 B4 
MINUTE ENTRY dated 3-10-92 B5 
LOG SHEET/MINUTE ENTRY dated 3-10-92 B6 
MINUTE ENTRY-NOTICE B7 
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE B8 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS; 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: 
Amendment IV 20 
Amendment V 1, 5, 11, 15 
Amendment VI 2, 5, 11, 13, 19, 27 
Amendment XIV 1, 5, 11, 13, 15 
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION: 
Article I, Section 7 2, 11 
Article I, Section 12 3, 11, 27 
Article I, Section 14 3, 20 
STATUTES; 
FEDERAL STATUTES: 
28 U.S.C. § 1827 , 17 
STATE STATUTES: 
Section 76-1-501(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended 3, 9, 10, 2 8 
Section 76-6-602, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended . • . . 3 
Section 76-6-603, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended . . 3, 20 
Section 77-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended . . . 3, 11 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended . 3 
Section 16-1-1, Orem City Code, as amended 1 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE: 
Rule 401 3, 26, 27 
Rule 402 3, 26, 27 
Rule 602 . 3, 26, 27 
iv 
Rule 901(a) 3, 26, 27 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; 
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 1 
CASES: 
Castellon v. Whitley, 739 F.Supp. 526 (D.Nev. 1990) . . . . . 18 
Giraldo-Rincon v. Dugger, 707 F.Supp. 504 (M.D.Fla. 1989) . . 13 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) . . . . . . . 11 
Hollowav v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173 (1978) . . 28 
People v. Avila, 797 P.2d 804 (Col.App. 1990) 12 
People v. Luu, 813 P.2d 826 (Col.App. 1991) 12 
People v. Rivera, 300 N.E.2d 869 (1973) 13 
State v. Allen, 505 P.2d 302 (Utah, 1973) 23 
State v. Bolsinger, 699 P. 2d 1214 (Utah 1985) 7 
State v. Cayer, 814 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1991) 1, 6 
State v. Hunt, 607 P.2d 297 (Utah 1980) 24 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989) 7 
State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484 (Utah App. 1991) 28 
State v. Montes, 804 P. 2d 543 (Utah App. 1991) 2, 19 
State v. Moosman, 794 P. 2d 474 (Utah 1990) 7 
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App. 1990) 7 
State v. Neave, 344 N.W.2d 181 (Wis. 1984) 13 
State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328 (Utah App. 1990) 7 
State v. Perdue, 813 P. 2d 1201 (Utah App. 1991) 7 
State v. Truiillo, 214 P.2d 626 (Utah 1950) 1, 12 
State v. Van Pham, 675 P.2d 848 (Kan. 1984) 14 
State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991) 1 
v 
State v. Watts. 639 P.2d 158 (Utah, 1981) 23 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 82 L.Ed. 2d 864, 104 
S.Ct. 3562, (1984) 2, 19, 28 
United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1973), cert, 
denied, 416 U.S. 907 40 L.Ed. 112, 94 S.Ct 1613 
(1974) 11, 12, 13 
U.S. v. Gallegos-Torres, 841 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1988) . . . . 17 
United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 310 F.Supp. 1304 
(E.D.N.Y. 1970), aff d, 434 F.2d. 386 (2d Cir. 1970) . . 11, 12 
Vallardes v. U.S., 871 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1989) . . . . 12, 17 
Viliborghi v. State of Arizona, 45 Ariz. 275, 43 P.2d 210 
(1935) 14 
vi 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this appeal by 
virtue of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 2 6 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (See Appendix A); and 78-2a-
3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (as amended) See Appendix A, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues presented on appeal of this matter are: 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the 
verdict. The standard of review is the marshalling of 
the evidence rule as follows: 
[A reviewing court must] view all the evidence and 
inferences that may reasonably be drawn from it in 
a light most favorable to the jury verdict, and 
[the] verdict will be reversed only if evidence is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted. State v. Caver, 
814 P.2d 604, 612 (Utah App. 1991). See also State 
v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991). 
2. Whether the trial court denied defendant his rights to 
confrontation, effective assistance of counsel and due 
process of law guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah 
Constitution by not providing defendant an interpreter. 
The standard of review in Utah is an abuse of 
discretion. See State v. Truiillo, 214 P.2d 626 (Utah 
1950). It is important to note, however, that the 
issue of whether provision of an interpreter is a 
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consitutional imperative has not as yet been addressed 
by any reviewing court in this state and review is 
timely. 
3. Whether defense counsel was ineffective in his 
representation of the defendant. The standard of 
review is set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052, reh'g denied, 467 
U.S. 1267, 82 L.Ed. 2d 864, 104 S.Ct. 3562, (1984) and 
adopted by Utah in State v. Montes, 804 P.2d 543 (Utah 
App. 1991) and reads as follows: 
i) The defendant must show that counsel's performance 
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. See Appendix A. State v. Montes, 8 04 P.2d 
543, 545 (Utah App. 1991); and 
ii) The defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires 
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial. State v. 
Montes, 804 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The following is a list of those constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules thought to be determinative. A complete text 
of each provision is found in Appendix A. 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7 
2 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14 
Section 76-1-501(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
Section 76-6-602, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amendeded 
Section 76-6-603, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
Section 77-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 401 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 4 02 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 602 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 901(a) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the charge on the 
2nd day of January, 1992. See Appendix Bl. The case was tried 
to the bench on the 10th day of March, 1992 and the defendant was 
found guilty as charged. See Appendix B5, B6, B7. 
Defendant appeals his conviction of Retail Theft, a Class B 
Misdemeanor on violation of Section 76-6-602, U.C.A 1953 (as 
amended) (See Appendix A) and adopted by Orem City in Section 16-
1-1 Orem City Code (as amended). 
RELEVANT FACTS OF THE CASE 
The defendant was tried and convicted by the bench on March 
10, 1992 of Retail Theft of a package of two video tapes from K-
Mart, 47 5 North State, Orem after having pled not-guilty on 
January 2, 1992. See Appendix B. He was represented by Randy 
Lish in the criminal trial. See Appendix B. On December 22, 
1991 the defendant purchased a blank Sony 8mm video tape from K-
Mart located in Orem, Utah. The following day, December 23, 
1991, Mr. Lee returned to K-mart. R. at 2 and 21. His intention 
was to return the video tape, purchased the previous day, and to 
purchase a caulking gun. R. at 21. He took his sales receipt 
for the video tape with him. R. at 21. As he approached the 
service desk to return the tape, the lines were extremely long as 
is usual for December 2 3 and the holiday season. R. at 21. Mr. 
Lee was in a hurry and became discouraged with the time it would 
take to return the tape and proceeded to purchase the caulking 
gun. R. at 21 and 24. He put the video tape back in the pocket 
of his coat and the receipt in his shirt pocket and went to 
purchase the caulking gun. R. at 22. Before he picked up the 
caulking gun he removed the tape from his pocket and placed it 
back in the K-Mart sack it had been in before standing in line at 
the service counter. Mr. Lee was stopped after he had purchased 
the caulking gun. R. at 5. Mr. Lee was then compelled by K-Mart 
security to make incriminating statements, was detained for 
greater than a reasonable time, and threatened in a manner 
inconsistent with state law and constitutional guarantees. R. at 
5-7 and 14-16. No pre-trial motions were made to challenge the 
propriety of these actions. See Appendix B for court minute 
entries absent any setting for hearing of pre-trial motions. 
Evidence was admitted during the trial without foundation and 
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counsel for the defendant offered no objection, further 
prejudicing Mr. Lee, R. at 9. 
Moreover, Mr. Lee is a native of Taiwan. Although he has 
lived in the United States for a number of years, Mr. Lee has 
only limited ability to communicate in English. R. at 20-28. It 
is difficult for him to understand others and even more difficult 
for others to understand him. R. at 2 0-28. Consequently, Mr Lee 
neither made the Court understand critical testimony nor 
understood the testimony presented. R. at 2 0-2 8. Counsel for 
defendant neither requested an interpreter nor did the Court 
inquire into the necessity. See Appendix B for minute entries 
showing no request or inquiry. Consequently, Mr. Lee was denied 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
In addition, evidence was presented that indicated K-Mart 
had not inventoried stock to determine whether a package of tapes 
had actually been missing on that day. R. at 17-2 0. Without 
such proof, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the 
conviction. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts that the verdict is not justified. 
Defendant contends that the City of Orem failed to satisfy the 
requirement that each element of the crime be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The prosecution never produced evidence that 
the item allegedly stolen by defendant was ever missing from the 
inventory of the merchant. Rather, it was shown that no inquiry 
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of inventory was ever made. Consequently, the evidence was not 
sufficient to convict defendant. Defendant further believes that 
his case was prejudiced by the absence of an interpreter to 
assist the court in understanding his testimony and to allow 
defendant to assist in his own defense and understand the 
procedure in which he was involved. Finally, he believes he was 
convicted as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
defense counsel never filed suppression motions; nor did he 
request translation assistance; nor did he make adequate 
objections to admissions of evidence; nor did defense counsel 
request that an inventory of the videotapes be conducted to 
establish that videotapes were not stolen. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE GUILTY VERDICT 
A. Applying the Standard of Review for Marshalling of the 
Evidence in the Light Most Favorable to the Verdict, the 
Prosecution Failed to Establish Defendant's Guilt Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt. 
Since 1985, the Utah Appellate Court's standard of review 
for a claim of insufficiency of evidence has been the marshalling 
of evidence rule. The Utah Court of Appeals held that in order 
to reverse a criminal conviction on the basis of insufficiency of 
the evidence, the reviewing court must: 
view all the evidence and inferences that may reasonably be 
drawn from it in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, 
and [the] verdict will be reversed only if evidence is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that defendant committed the crime of which he was 
6 
convicted. State v. Caver, 814 P.2d 604, 612 (Utah App. 
1991). 
This standard has been adopted and applied by this court in 
numerous other cases. See State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah 
App. 1991); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App. 1990); State 
v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah App. 1990); [citing State 
v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)]; State v. 
Bolsinaer, 699 P.2d 1214, 1218 (Utah 1985). The marshalling 
requirement has also been applied to criminal bench trials by the 
Utah Supreme Court. State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 
1990). 
Complying with the marshalling of the evidence rule, the 
record shows that: 
1. The defendant was in K-Mart in Orem on or about December 23, 
1991. R. at 2. 
2. At one point during his visit to K-Mart Mr. Lee was observed 
with a package of tapes in his hands. R. at 4. 
3. Mr. Lee was observed later with a "crinkled up K-Mart bag" 
and a caulking gun in his hands. R. at 4. 
4. Mr. Lee was stopped after going through the checkstand, 
having payed only for a caulking gun. R. at 5. 
5. Mr. Lee gave some statement to store security, the content 
of which is not entirely clear, but which security construed as 
an admission that he put the tapes into a bag. R. at 7. 
In addition, the record also shows that: 
1. At no time was Mr. Lee observed putting the tapes in his 
pocket. R. at 10. 
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2. The tapes were admitted into evidence based upon an improper 
foundation, R. at 9. 
3. The security officer was not in constant visual contact with 
Mr. Lee during this episode. R. at 12. 
4. Security testified that inventory control was available but 
that she couldn't check because she couldn't leave the suspect. 
R. at 18. However, it is also clear that she never checked the 
inventory to determine whether the tapes were in fact stolen 
despite an opportunity during the period of detention or the 
three months between the arrest and trial. R. at 19. 
5. Mr. Lee had explanations for many of the allegations but was 
unable to communicate effectively. Thus neither his side of the 
story nor his evidence was ever actually considered. R. at 2 0-
28. 
6. Mr. Lee stated he had a receipt for the allegedly stolen 
items, the receipt was never offered nor admitted into evidence 
and consequently, never considered by the court. 
As listed above, incongruities are apparent when an attempt 
is made to marshall the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the verdict. Reasonable minds could easily differ when 
confronted with such conflicting evidence. Therefore, the 
evidence is not conclusive to the verdict. Rather, it creates a 
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. 
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B. The City of Orem Failed to Satisfy the Requirement that 
the Crime be Proven Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Because the 
City has Never Shown by Investigating the Stored Videotape 
Inventory that the Videotapes were Stolen 
Section 76-1-501(1) of the Utah Code Annotated requires that 
elements of a crime be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that 
a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed 
to be innocent until each element of the offense 
charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall 
be acquitted. 76-1-501(1) U.C.A. 1953 (as amended). 
Consequently, the burden falls upon the prosecution to prove 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Absent such a 
showing, the defendant should be acquitted. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has addressed the scope of the 
reasonable doubt standard. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt... is a doubt that is 
based on reason, ... one which is reasonable in view of 
all the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not 
a doubt which is based on a wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon it and obviates all reasonable 
doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable 
men and women would entertain and it must arise from 
the evidence or ... lack of evidence...State v. Perdue, 
813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App. 1991) (footnote 1). 
Based upon this interpretation, it is apparent that 
reasonable doubt is not a low threshold that prosecution may 
easily reach; rather, the prosecution has a significant burden. 
The prosecution in this case did not meet its burden of proof to 
establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
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videotapes in the store were never inventoried to determine if 
any were missing. Testimony presented at trial showed there was 
an opportunity and a method by which an inventory check could 
have been conducted, R. at 17-19• Although the store may not 
have been able to determine if these exact tapes were stolen, it 
could have determined if any tapes were missing from inventory, 
suggesting that it was at least probable or improbable that this 
particular brand and type of tape had unaccounted packages 
missing from inventory. Further testimony showed the inventory 
check was not made simply because it was not routinely conducted 
at the time of the alleged theft and was burdensome to the 
employee. It was never determined that a later check would have 
effectively ruled out the possibility of theft. Nor should the 
burden upon the store be the overriding concern when it is 
charging an individual with a crime and when a possible means of 
verifying the validity of the criminal charge is at hand. 
This raises the question as to whether there was a retail 
theft at all? Further, Mr. Lee had a receipt for the merchandise 
which was never considered by the store or the court. It was 
never conclusively shown that the videotapes improperly admitted 
as evidence were actually stolen. Therefore, reasonable minds 
would have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. By the exact 
definition of Section 76-1-501(1) Utah Code Annotated, defendant 
is innocent because he was not proven guilty. The verdict should 
be overturned. 
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II. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution in 
pertinent part reads, tf[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf." 
This Utah constitutional guarantee was also codified in 77-1-6, 
U.C.A. 1953 (as amended). See Appendix A. 
Defendant was denied due process of law, his right to 
confrontation, and effective assistance of counsel when his case 
proceeded without an interpreter, as discussed in the following 
subsections: 
A. The Trial Court Denied Defendant His Rights to 
Confrontation/ Effective Assistance of Counsel and Due 
Process of Law Guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution by Not Providing 
Defendant an Interpreter. (See Appendix A). 
Foreign nationals enjoy the same rights afforded citizens 
accused of a crime under the Constitution. Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 (1952). However, several of these 
rights cannot be preserved without the assistance of an 
interpreter when a defendant cannot speak or understand English. 
Among these rights are the right to counsel, United States ex 
rel. Negron v. New York, 310 F.Supp. 1304, 1308 (E.D.N.Y.1970), 
aff'd, 434 F.2d. 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970); the right to confront 
adverse witnesses, United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st 
Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 416 U.S. 907, 40 L.Ed. 112, 94 S.Ct. 
1613 (1974) ; the right to cross-examine those witnesses, and the 
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right to be present and participate at one's own trial. Negron, 
434 F.2d at 380-90; Carrion, 488 F.2d at 14. Any prosecution of 
these defendants without an interpreter is constitutionally 
unsound and constitutionally unfair. The Constitutional 
guarantees afforded criminal defendants, therefore, require that 
an interpreter be appointed for them. 
The case before the court involves a two-fold inadequacy. 
First Mr. Lee was unable to effectively understand what was 
happening around him. He could not contribute and assist in his 
own defense nor understand those giving evidence against him. 
Second, he could not make himself understood by the court and his 
counsel and therefore, could not provide evidence of what he 
believed the facts to be. Clearly under this handicap, the court 
ruled after receiving only part of the story. 
In 1991, the Colorado Appellate Court ruled that although 
the non-English speaking defendant was present during the closing 
arguments and the reading of the jury instructions, the absence 
of an interpreter was equivalent to defendant not being present 
at all. People v. Luu, 813 P.2d 826; Cf. People v. Avila, 797 
P.2d 804 (Colo. App. 1990). 
While many states and Circuits have held the appointment of 
an interpreter within the discretion of the trial court judge, 
See Vallardes v. U.S., 871 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1989); State v. 
Truiillo, 214 P.2d 626 (Utah 1950), there is also strong and 
persuasive language that discretion must be tempered "with reason 
and concern for the rights of the defendant seeking the 
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assistance of an interpreter." Giraldo-Rincon v. Dugger, 707 
F.Supp. 504 (M.D.Fla. 1989). The court in Giraldo-Rincon further 
held 
Considerations of fairness, the integrity of the fact-
finding process and the potency of our adversary system 
of justice forbid that the state should prosecute a 
defendant who is not present at his own trial (cites 
omitted) unless by his conduct he waives that right, 
(cites omitted). And it is equally imperative that 
every criminal defendant — if the right to be present 
is to have meaning — possess 'sufficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding.' (cites omitted). 
Otherwise, '[t]he adjudication loses its character as a 
reasoned interaction...and becomes an invective against 
an insensible object.' (cite omitted). Giraldo-Rincon 
supra at 507 quoting United States of America v. The 
State of New York, 310 F.Supp. 1304 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), 
aff'd 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2nd Cir.1970). 
Other courts have held that although the appointment of an 
interpreter may be discretionary, there is an implied duty to 
inquire as to the necessity of interpretation assistance. United 
State v. Carrion. 488 F.2d 12 (1973), cert denied 416 U.S. 907, 
40 L.Ed. 112, 94 S.Ct. 1613 (1974) (trial court duty to inquire 
was satisfied where court specifically asked counsel if defendant 
was able to understand English and to which counsel replied in 
the affirmative); People v. Rivera, 300 N.E.2d 869 (111. 1973) 
(under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, a trial judge has a duty to appoint an interpreter 
sua sponte and at any stage of the proceeding if the necessity in 
order to enable the defendant to participate in the process 
becomes manifest to the court); State v. Neave, 344 N.W.2d 181 
(Wis. 1984) (with due regard for the right of a criminal 
defendant, who did not understand English, the services of an 
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interpreter requires that when the court is on notice of a 
language difficulty, the court is required to make a factual 
determination as to whether the disability is sufficient so as to 
prevent the defendant from communicating or understanding). 
In this case Mr. Lee's inability to communicate and 
understand became manifest to the trial court and it was on 
notice simply by his courtroom demeanor and lack of ability to 
respond and be understood. At any rate any problems could have 
been resolved with a few short questions from the bench. 
The key is that an inquiry has to be made. Utah is as yet 
silent on the issue of whether the right to an interpreter is a 
constitutional imperative. However, if the right to 
confrontation, effective assistance of counsel and to be present 
at one's own criminal proceeding, as guaranteed by the Utah 
Constitution, is to have any value at all the trial judge must be 
held to some measure of inquiry to ensure the validity of the 
proceeding. One court has said that "[a] common test on 
appellate review of whether a trial court erred in declining to 
appoint an interpreter is whether or not such failure hampered 
the defendant in any manner in presenting his case fairly to the 
jury." State v. Van Pham, 675 P.2d 848, 860 (Kan. 1984) 
(emphasis added). See also Viliborghi v. State of Arizona, 45 
Ariz. 275, 283, 43 P.2d 210 (1935). 
The record in this case is replete with "inaudible" as the 
transcriber struggled with understanding the testimony of Mr. 
Lee. The defendant, struggling with trying to make himself 
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understood, tried to enhance his communications skills with 
motions and mannerisms which the court ordered him to stop. R. 
at 22. Clearly, Mr. Lee was hampered in presenting his case 
fairly to the fact finder and from understanding the proceedings 
sufficiently to assist counsel while the trial was in progress. 
Furthermore, defendant's right to due process of law as 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and made applicable to the 
states by the Fourteenth Amendment (See Appendix A) was violated 
in that he was denied the right to be confronted by the evidence 
that eventually convicted him. Mr. Lee had a plausible 
explanation for the misunderstanding. He went to K-Mart to 
return tapes and buy a caulking gun. As he was waiting for a 
service manager he removed the tapes from the paper bag, wadded 
up the bag and placed it in his coat pocket and waited patiently 
for a refund on the merchandise with the tape package and the 
receipt in his hand. After a long wait (it was December 23) and 
fearing he would miss a flight he was hurrying to catch he 
decided to return the tapes later when it wasn't so busy. He put 
the tapes in his coat pocket and the receipt in his pocket as is 
his custom when he is shopping. He wanted to purchase a caulking 
gun and on the way he noticed a sale on tapes. He was curious to 
see if the sale price was as good as the price he had paid for 
similar tapes elsewhere and he had to look carefully to determine 
that they were the proper brand and specification. As he looked 
at the tapes he remembered the ones he had slipped into his 
pocket at the service counter and, trying to avoid an incident, 
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took the package out of his pocket and replaced it in the 
crinkled K-Mart bag, then replaced the bag in his pocket and took 
the caulking gun to the front to purchase it. 
After he paid for the gun, he was stopped by security and 
during the ensuing interrogation it became apparent that his 
inability to communicate had become a disability. He was late 
for a flight and simply did not want complications. Further, 
even though he may not have understood all of the words used by 
the security personnel, he soon realized the intent and was 
embarrassed. Believing he had done nothing wrong, he tried to 
leave at which time he was physically restrained by store 
personnel. He was made to believe by the security person, Ms. 
Callahan that if he walked to the back of the store with them, 
they would talk to him briefly and allow him to be on his way 
with no further embarrassment. However, nothing could have been 
further from the truth. 
The security personnel only wanted to coerce a statement to 
aid in Mr. Lee's arrest and conviction. Mr. Lee did not 
understand and K-Mart personnel took advantage of the language 
disability. They wanted him to admit that he put the tapes in 
the bag. That presented no problem to Mr. Lee. He had put his 
own tapes into a bag he had brought with him. He did not 
understand that his innocent statement would be misconstrued to 
become an admission of guilt. 
Even though this represents a plausible alternative to the 
version presented by K-Mart and the City of Orem, little of it 
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was brought out at trial because Mr. Lee was unable to make 
himself understood. Indeed, it was as though counsel and the 
court simply tired of trying to understand him and elected to 
give preference to the prosecution witnesses' version because it 
was easier. Consequently, it was as though he was absent from 
the hearing and was convicted without even being involved in his 
own trial. He was therefore, denied due process of law. 
B. Defendant was Prejudiced in His Defense by the Lack of 
an Interpreter, Robbing Him of His Right to Assist in His 
Own Defense and To Understand the Procedure in Which He was 
Involved, 
Although this is a case governed by state law, Utah has no 
specific statutory provision relative to the right of a person to 
an interpreter. It is helpful in the absence of state 
legislative guidance, to look to the federal law. The federal 
Court Interpreters Act places a mandatory duty on the trial court 
to inquire as to the need for an interpreter when the defendant 
has difficulty with English. 28 U.S.C. § 1827; Vallardes v. U.S., 
871 F.2d 1564 (Ga. 1989). For example, the 8th Circuit Court of 
Appeals in U.S. v. Galleaos-Torres, 841 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1988), 
held that because the defendant had answered affirmatively to the 
district court's query of his English skills, there was no 
violation of the defendant's right to a fair trial. However, the 
court emphasized that had the District Court failed in making 
this inquiry, the District Court would have been in error for 
failure to appoint sua sponte an interpreter for a defendant with 
English-speaking difficulties. Although, the appointment of an 
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interpreter is at the discretion of the Court, Castellon v. 
Whitley, 739 F.Supp. 526 (D.Nev. 1990), the Court must 
nevertheless make the necessary inquiry. In the case at bar, 
neither counsel nor the trial judge inquired of the defendant's 
English-speaking abilities, at any time during the proceedings. 
This subsequently disabled the defendant, making him unable to 
assist in his own defense, unable to understand the procedure in 
which he was involved and detrimentally prejudiced defendant's 
case. Moreover, it was especially harmful to defendant's case as 
he was a foreigner in an unfamiliar judicial system. 
In addition, defendant's attempts to communicate with hand 
gestures to express himself were curbed by direct order from the 
judge. R. at 22. The transcript records "inaudible" responses 
as well as numerous requests from defendant for questions to be 
repeated that explicitly indicate defendant's limited ability to 
communicate in English. This point is further emphasized by 
defendant's stilted remarks, grammatical and semantic errors. 
Defendant in this case was subjected to trial without the 
effective assistance of counsel, without the right to confront 
and cross-examine adverse witnesses and was without the right to 
be present and participate in his own trial because he was denied 
his constitutional right to an interpreter. Defendant could 
neither effectively communicate in English nor adequately 
function in an unfamiliar judicial system. Consequently, the 
absence of an interpreter was equivalent to defendant not being 
present. Therefore, defendant was considerably disadvantaged in 
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his own defense and failure of the trial judge to inquire as to 
defendant's need for an interpreter constituted an abuse of 
discretion. 
III. DEFENDANTS COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN HIS REPRESENTATION OF 
THE DEFENDANT. 
The United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, reh'g 
denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 82 L.Ed. 2d 864, 104 S.Ct. 3562, (1984) 
established the standard of review for a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. This two-prong standard is: 
i) The defendant must show that counsel's performance 
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the "counsel11 guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. See Appendix A. State v. Montes, 804 P. 2d 
543, 545 (Utah App. 1991); and 
ii) The defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires 
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial. State v. 
Montes, 804 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah App. 1991). 
As the following subsections will show defense counsel in 
this case was ineffective because he never challenged the 
detention by store personnel; he failed to request an interpreter 
in the face of overwhelming need; he failed to make adequate 
objections to inadmissible evidence; and he failed to admit 
potentially exculpatory evidence on behalf of defendant. 
A. Defense Counsel Never Challenged the Propriety of Mr. 
Lee's Detention by Persons in Authority at the Site of the 
Alleged Offense. 
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Defense counsel never filed a motion to challenge the 
detention by security personnel at the store nor did counsel 
object or question the witnesses as to the detention procedure 
employed. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution says: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. United States Constitution, 
Amendment IV (See Appendix A). 
Of greater importance, the Utah Constitution mirrors the 
provisions found in the federal law. See Utah Constitution, 
Article I, Section 14. (See Appendix A). 
Under usual circumstances, therefore, the Fourth Amendment 
and the similar state guarantee do not apply to situation wherein 
the person questioning or detaining is not part of the government 
or its agent. The Fourth Amendment is specifically directed to 
governmental entities. However, even private parties must 
confine their actions in detaining a suspected offender to what 
is reasonable. 
The Utah Retail Theft Act provides: 
Any merchant who has probable cause to believe that a 
person has committed retail theft may detain such 
person, on or off the premises of a retail mercantile 
establishment, in a reasonable manner and for a 
reasonable length of time for all or any of the 
following purposes: 
(1) To make reasonable inquiry as to whether such 
person has in his possession unpurchased 
merchandise and to make reasonable investigation 
of the ownership of such merchandise; 
(2) To request identification; 
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(3) To verify such identification; 
(4) To make a reasonable request of such person 
to place or keep in full view any merchandise such 
individual may have removed, or which the merchant 
has reason to believe he may have removed, from 
its place of display or elsewhere, whether for 
examination, purchase or for any other reason; 
(5) To inform a peace officer of the detention of 
the person and surrender that person to the 
custody of a peace officer;... U.C.A. 76-6-603 
(1953, as amended). 
Clearly K-Mart had the authority to detain Mr. Lee to 
investigate the offense it reasonably believed had taken place. 
The question then becomes whether the methods used to 
interrogate, the length of the detention and the scope and manner 
of the detention were "reasonable" as required by the statute. 
In this case, Mr. Lee was physically compelled to submit to 
the detention. In the words of David Ferman, "I was solely 
concerned and concentrating on trying to subdue the witness or 
the defendant, and get him back to the security office, away from 
the customers." R. at 14. Mr. Ferman testified that he "...sat 
him [Mr. Lee] down and tried to start the paperwork..." R. at 
14. "After several times of putting him back into the seat and 
after continually trying to calm him down and talk to him, to 
fill out the paperwork...we just decided to call the police..." 
R. at 14. Finally, Mr. Ferman testified he observed little 
because "...I was concerned mostly with just keeping the 
defendant in his chair and protecting the security officer." R. 
at 15. 
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All of these statements speak to the force, the coercion, 
employed to compel Mr, Lee to remain and "fill out the 
paperwork." 
In addition, Ms, Callahan, in her trial testimony, alluded 
to deceptive promises she made to Mr, Lee, Mr, Lee is from a 
culture, Taiwan, that places great emphasis on honor. He was 
embarrassed by this incident; he understood only by the physical 
compulsion not the words that allegations were being made against 
him and he was embarrassed by the commotion. He tried to leave 
to end the humiliation. 
K-Mart personnel took advantage of Mr. Lee's lack of 
communicative skills and induced him into statements they then 
misconstrued as admission. By Ms. Callahan's own testimony she 
promised some kind of concession in exchange for cooperation, 
"...and he kept trying to say, you know if I do this will you let 
me go and I-I basically told him that we needed to do the 
paperwork and then we would talk. If he would come back, and we 
would take care of things that we needed to take care of." R. at 
6. (Emphasis added). 
Important to note is that Ms. Callahan said he kept "trying 
to say" as though she recognized his inability to effectively 
communicate. Secondly, in light of this inability, Ms. 
Callahan's promises induced Mr. Lee to make statements and act in 
a way he wouldn't have acted absent coercion. Failure to 
challenge the detention constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
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Further, no evidence was even elicited from Mr. Lee or any 
other witness on cross examination regarding the conditions of 
the detention, the amount of time he was detained, the extent and 
type of force used by store personnel. Failure to determine 
these factors constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel 
In State v. Watts, the Utah Supreme Court addressed many of 
the issues presented in this appeal. In that case, the court 
reviewed the application of the detention provision of the Retail 
Theft Act. As a preliminary matter, the court held that ff[i]n 
order for a confession to be admissible, it must be made freely 
and voluntarily; it must not be extracted by threats or violence 
or obtained by improper influence or promises." State v. Watts, 
639 P.2d 158, 160 (Utah, 1981). In Watts, the court upheld the 
conviction. However, the two cases may be distinguished. First, 
in Watts, evidence of the defendant's statements was admitted 
after a proper challenge and hearing on admissibility. Such was 
not the case in this matter. Mr. Lee never had an opportunity to 
have the admissibility reviewed because no motion to bring it 
before the court was made. See State v. Allen, 505 P.2d 3 02 
(Utah, 1973) . 
Further, when introduced in court, defense counsel did not 
even offer the appropriate objection. The second distinguishing 
factor is that in Watts, the confession was made only after the 
inducement to confess had been withdrawn. Watts 505 P.2d at 160. 
In this case inducements were made at the outset and throughout 
the incident. Third, in Watts, the detaining agent was not 
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considered a "person in authority". He was the store manager. 
In the case at bar, Mr. Lee was detained by security personnel 
hired specifically for this purpose, vested with the authority to 
act as though they were police officers and trained in obtaining 
legally admissible evidence with an eye toward testimony and 
conviction. Clearly, these security officers were in a position 
of authority. 
Had evidence obtained as a result of this detention and 
interrogation been reviewed prior to trial as should have been 
done, this court would apply a totality of the circumstances 
standard to review findings of the trial court. State v. Hunt, 
607 P.2d 297 (Utah 1980). Using that standard in this instance, 
clearly the totality of the circumstance shows that the detention 
would bear a challenge at the very least. Even so, no such 
challenge was made. Failure to pursue this avenue is ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
In addition, defendant had significant constitutional rights 
impaired when he was forcibly restrained from leaving the store 
and coerced into making a written statement by his detainers. 
Mr. Lee was confused and unfamiliar with the social and 
legal system of the store. He was under the impression he would 
be allowed to leave if he wrote a statement and he was forcibly 
placed and kept in a chair in a security office when he had only 
come to the store to return a packet of videotapes that he didn't 
want. Under this pressure, he took the only alternative 
available to him. He signed a statement under the assumption 
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that he would be released because that was what was asked of him. 
Finally, the only legible words from his statement are, "put 
tapes in bag" R. at 7. This statement never indicated that these 
tapes were taken from the shelf and put in a bag. Rather, he 
could have been expressing the fact that the tapes were removed 
from his coat pocket and put into a bag to be returned to the 
store. Even though the issues present unanswerable questions to 
the court they could have been addressed and resolved at trial. 
Failure to recognize or attempt resolution constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
B. Defense Counsel Failed to Request a Translator for 
Defendant, thus Depriving Defendant of a Fair Trial. 
Defense counsel was retained to represent the best interests 
of his client and to ensure that defendant received a fair trial. 
By not requesting a translator for defendant, defendant was 
denied a fair trial. Admittedly, the trial court had discretion 
to appoint an interpreter. However, when an inquiry was not made 
by the court as to defendant's English abilities, defense counsel 
had a responsibility to move the court to provide his client with 
translation assistance. 
C Defense Counsel Failed to Make Adequate Objections to 
Admissions of Evidence. 
The videotapes were admitted with no foundation, with no 
chain of evidence established and with no objection to either 
shortcoming. No testimony was elicited that would show that the 
package of tapes admitted were in fact the ones confiscated on 
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the date Mr, Lee was detained. There was no testimony as to 
distinguishing marks or anything to show it wasn't taken off the 
shelf at some time after the incident. 
At one point in the proceeding, the prosecution had turned 
examination of Ms, Callahan over to defense counsel. Defense 
counsel had begun cross examination when the prosecution 
interrupted, had the evidence marked and entered with no 
foundation and no objection. R. at 9. It is petitioner's 
position that such oversights were prejudicial to the defendant's 
case but even if this court finds it less than critical, it is 
still a measure of the deficient representation that defendant 
had. 
Additionally, even though the prosecution had failed to show 
evidence that the tapes in question were ever really taken from 
K-Mart, and had therefore, failed to prove the elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, no motion to dismiss was made at 
the conclusion of the City's evidence. 
Defense counsel should have objected to the videotapes being 
entered as evidence. Without proper foundation, the evidence is 
neither relevant, Utah Rules of Evidence, 401 and 402, nor 
competent, Utah Rules of Evidence 901. See Appendix A. The 
videotapes were assumed stolen in the absence of direct evidence. 
Furthermore, defense counsel should have objected to the 
written statement inferring that defendant had taken the 
videotapes off the shelf and "put in bag" R. at 7. Defense 
counsel could and should have objected on the grounds of lack of 
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personal knowledge, Utah Rules of Evidence 602 , or lack of 
foundation, Utah Rules of evidence 401, 402 and 901. See 
Appendix A. 
D. Defense Counsel Failed to Admit Critical Evidence 
Supporting Defendant's Case and Establishing a Defense. 
Defendant was in the store to return the unwanted videotapes 
he had purchased the previous day. He had in his possession the 
receipt for the videotapes he had purchased in addition to the K-
Mart bag in which he had received his purchase. Defense counsel 
negligently failed to enter these items as evidence to confirm 
defendant's innocence. 
E. The Oversights and Omissions Referred to are Critical 
and Determinative. 
Clearly defense counsel's performance was deficient. By 
allowing inadmissible evidence before the fact finder with no 
Motion to Suppress or objection; by failing to challenge 
foundations and coerced statements; by failing to address the 
propriety of the detention of the merchant's agents, counsel put 
the defendant in the position of having no counsel at all, a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and of Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. See Appendix A. 
Further the oversights and errors clearly prejudiced the 
defense. The admission of non-admissible evidence with no 
objection and no record along with failure to move to dismiss 
deprived the defendant of a fair trial. 
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 490, provides the 
defendant must point to specific instances in the record which, 
under the circumstances, show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. Having so shown in this case, ff[t]he right to 
effective assistance of counsel is so basic to a fair trial that 
[its] infraction can never be treated as harmless error." State 
v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484 (Utah App. 1991) , citing to Holloway v. 
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1181 (1978). Based 
on the foregoing, defendant's counsel was so deficient that 
defendant was deprived of a fair trial and it was as though he 
had no counsel at all. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, even in the light most favorable to the 
verdict under the marshalling of the evidence rule, the verdict 
is unjustified. The prosecution failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt defendant's guilt in that the evidence was 
inconclusive and highly speculative. Thus, by the exact 
definition of Section 76-1-501(1) Utah Code Annotated, defendant 
is innocent. Further, the defendant's case was prejudiced by the 
absence of an interpreter and he was convicted as a result of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. For these reasons, the 
judgement of the Trial Court of the Fourth Circuit, Orem 
Department, must be overturned. 
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APPENDIX A 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
(In applicable parts) 
AMENDMENT IV; (Unreasonable searches and seizures) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V; (Criminal actions — provisions concerning — Due 
process of law and just compensation clauses) 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment 
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War 
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, with due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI: (Rights of accused) 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall be committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
AMENDMENT XIV; (Citizenship - Due Process of law - Equal 
protection) 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
Al 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
(In applicable parts) 
Article I; Section 7; Due Process of Law 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Article I; Section 12; Rights of accused persons 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to be committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, 
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Article I, Section 14; Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of Warrant 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(In applicable parts) 
Section 76-1-501 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against 
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of 
such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
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(2) As used in this part the words "elements of the offense 
mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results 
of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the 
definition of the offense; or 
(b) The culpable mental state; 
Section 76-6-602 
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he 
knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers 
or causes to be carried away or transferred, any merchandise 
displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment with the intention of retaining 
such merchandise or with the intention of depriving the 
merchant permanently of the possession, use or benefit of 
such merchandise without paying the retail value of such 
merchandise; or 
(2) Alters, transfers, or removes any label, price tag, 
marking, indicia of value or any other markings which aid in 
determining value of any merchandise displayed, held, stored 
or offered for sale, in a retail mercantile establishment 
and attempts to purchase such merchandise personally or in 
consort with another at less than the retail value with the 
intention of depriving the merchant of the retail value of 
such merchandise; or 
(3) Transfers any merchandise displayed, held stored or 
offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment from 
the container with the intention of depriving the merchant 
of the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(4) Under-rings with the intention of depriving the 
merchant of the retail value of the merchandise; or 
(5) Removes a shopping cart from the premises of a retail 
mercantile establishment with the intent of depriving the 
merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such cart. 
Section 76-6-603 
Any merchant who has probable cause to believe that a person 
has committed retail theft may detain such person, on or off the 
premises of a retail mercantile establishment, in a reasonable 
manner and for a reasonable length of time for all or any of the 
following purposes: 
(1) To make reasonable inquiry as to whether such person 
has in his possession unpurchased merchandise and to make 
reasonable investigation of the ownership of such 
merchandise; 
(2) To request identification; 
(3) To verify such identification; 
A 3 
(4) To make a reasonable request of such person to place or 
keep in full view any merchandise such individual may have 
removed, or which the merchant has reason to believe he may 
have removed, from its place of display or elsewhere, 
whether for examination, purchase or for any other 
reasonable purpose; 
(5) To inform a pease officer of the detention of the 
person and surrender that person to the custody of a peace 
officer; 
(6) In the case of a minor, to inform a peace officer, the 
parents, guardian or other private person interested in the 
welfare of that minor immediately, if possible, of this 
detention and to surrender custody of such minor to such 
person, 
A merchant may make a detention as permitted herein off the 
premises of a retail mercantile establishment only if such 
detention is pursuant to an immediate pursuit of such person• 
Section 77-1-6: Rights of defendant 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be controlled by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of 
witnesses in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district where the offense is alleged to have 
been committed; 
(g) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of 
law, to be entitled to a trial within 3 0 days after 
arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business 
of the court permits 
(2) (omitted) 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from 
the small claims department of a circuit court; 
A4 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 4 01; Definition of "relevant evidence" 
"Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402; Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant 
evidence inadmissible 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or 
by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 602; Lack of personal knowledge 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal 
knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge 
may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness 
himself. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, 
relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses. 
Rule 901(a); Reguirement of authentication or identification 
(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication 
or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is 
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
matter in question is what its proponent claims. 
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APPENDIX B 
/ify, ITY/STATE VS. 
Defendant 
OUNTER 
{Hearing 
kddress 
faJtltiA Q3L 
?d FH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF I H 
UI AH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMEN. 
97 East Center Street, Orem, Utah 
(801)226-6823 
Case/# / o ^ / 0OO2*> Date /-2-9 
Judge ^ 7 ' J T ^ ^
 t Clerk ^ . 
' Counter Numbe 
z 
Aa 
Tape Number ^ c ^ ~ / ~ 
Charge # 1 . 
Charge #2. 
Charge #3. 
& * > . & . 
0 
urrent address has been verified with defendant 
Defendant appeared • Defendant failed to appear • Defendant in custody 
BAA/ issued • Bail $ • Non-bailable • Plus $85.00 BW fee 
Forfeit bail/bond 
Clerk to renotice D Plaintiff to issue summons 
Defendant given copy of information 
nbrmation read /uQfefendant advised to rights 
penalties expiainea^S^Defendant acknowledged (s)he understands rights, charge(s), penalties 
Defendant was given ^nd and 3rd offense warning in open court. 
• Defendant Pro Se 
Defense Attorney Prosecutor 
• Request for counsel: • Granted D Denied 
Court appointed attorney: Contact 
City/Randy Lish - 930 South State, #10, Orem 224-2119 
State 
D 
• 
D 
• PLEA: 
NG=not guilty 1). 
GP=guilty plea 2). 
NC=no contest 3). 
AM=amended charge 4). 
BAIL: $ 
TkUL. 
h^ 
D Plea accepted 
To 
To. 
To. 
To. 
j^W 
SENTENCING: 
D Defendant waived t 
Case continued to 
1. FineS 
2. FineS 
3 
D 
D 
a 
a 
a 
a 
D 
a 
e for imposition oi sentenc >sitio  p; sente ce / 
. for imposition/sentence/entrv of plea 
!TiaU_ 
FineS 
Defendant to pay: • 
Victim restitution S 
Other $ 
days in jail 
days in jail 
days in jail 
.of fine and. 
.of fine and. 
of fine and 
Victim reparation 
• Alcohol rehabilitation S 
Fine to be paid on or before. 
(on monthlv payments of $ _ 
jail suspended on cond. of probation/or rme pvmt. 
jail suspended on cond. ot probation/or tine pymt. 
jail suspended on cond. of probation/or tine pymt. 
• Drug testing 
• 
Drug prevention . 
Total Amount 
. to begin . 
(or) as instructed by Adult Probation and Parole. 
PROBATION: 
D Defendant to be on probation for months with • AP&P • Court D Unsupervised 
Defendant to report immediateity to: 
• Probation office, 150 East Center Street, Provo 374-7633 
Review date D Presentence • 
D 
a 
a 
D 
a 
Utah County Department of Substance Abuse, 100 East Center, Suite 3200, Provo, Utah 370-8427 
Defendant to obtain an alcohol evaluation 
Defendant is to complete classes as recommended 
Defendant is to pay Utah County Substance Abuse directly 
Utah State Fund to pay for evaluation/classes 
• COMMITMENT: issued for days. To be served by in Utah County Jai 
• WORK RELEASE: Defendant may serve 
bv . Contact: ACS Director, 150 East Center Street, Provo, 374 
1775 South Dakota Lane, Provo 
hours community service 
633. 
Bl 
SP-AF0336 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
MeCuilouqh, Jonas, 
& Ivins 
330 Soutn State St. 
Suae 10 
Orem Utan $4058 
Sift^n COURT G 
GRHM 
JAH n raww'^ 
RANDY M. LISH (3823) 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
930 South State, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
oooOooo 
CITY OF OREM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KOTUNG LEE, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 52Lgl2d> 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW Randy M. Lish of the law firm of McCullough, Jones 
and Ivins, and enters his notice of appearance of counsel for 
Kotung Lee in the above entitled matter. 
DATED this 10 day of January, 1992. 
McCullough, Jones & Ivins 
Randy «•. Lish 
1 s* 
f v~ 
a 
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
CITY OF OREM 
vs 
Plaintiff, 
KOTUNG LEE 
C/O RANDY LISH, ATTORNEY 
930 SOUTH STATE, #10 
OREM, UT 84058 
Defendant, 
NOTICE OF SETTING 
CASE NO. 921000023 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the above entitled case is set for 
PRE TRIAL CONFERENCE , on the 10th day of February, 1992 at 9:30 A.M. 
at the Fourth Circuit Court, Orem Department, 97 East Center, Orem 
Utah, in courtroom #1. 
Dated: January 24, 1992 
CHARGES: RETAIL THEFT 
Kristine Christiansen 
Deputy Court Clerk 
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Notice of Setting were 
mailed, postage prepaid, on this 24th day of January , 1992 to the 
following interested parties: 
Orem City Attorney, 97 East Center, Orem, UT 84057 
Defendant, In care of counsel at the address above 
Kristine Christianson 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
Qjff.m DEPARTMENT 
LOG SHEET/MINUTE ENTRY 
/V-kj 
Plaintiff 
Case Number ^ / / W ^ P ^ 
. ^
/
' % p e _ ^ 5 & d _ _ Clark &S 
Date , ^ 7 0 • ^ 
V. 
Defendant 
Judge. ii^. 
Pit. Counsel. 
Def. Counsel 
Offense It *ru i 
^ # 
Counter* } C-^J^ Proceedings 9re - -hiAl 
U <5h W 
^T WOO 3-//)-<?,*-
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"OURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UT* 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMEN 
97 East Center Street, Orem, Utah 
ATE vs. KffcZ* l&e 
(801)226-6823 
Case/# __ 
judge 
eri 1-2 ^ 
•Tin 
COUNTER 
Hearing 
Address 
Tape Number. 
Date 5 - / 4 - . 7 J L 
Clerk &D-J+-
. Counter Number 
Charge #1 
Charge #2 
Charge #3 
T 
D Current address has been verified with defendant 
• Defendant appeared Q Defendant failed to appear • Defendant in custody 
D B/W issued • Bail $ • Non-bailable D Plus $85.00 BW fee 
• Forfeit bail/bond 
• Clerk to renotice D Plaintiff to issue summons 
• Defendant given copy of information 
• Information read • Defendant advised to rights 
• Penalties explained • Defendant acknowledged (s)he understands rights, charge(s), penalties 
D Defendant was given 2nd and 3rd offense warning in opeRcourt. * 
Prosecutor 
• Request for counsel: • Granted • Denied 
• Court appointed attorney: Contact 
D City/Randy Lish - 930 South State, #10, Orem 224-2119 
• State 
• PLEA: 
NG=not guilty 1) To 
GP=guilty plea 2) To 
NC=no contest 3) To _ _ 
AM=amended charge 4) To 
BAIL: S 
1 7)C?^A/<±1-
Defen$£ Attorney ^T 
*L Q Defendant Pro Se 
• Plea accepted 
SENTENClTsJG: 
Da Defendant waived time for imposition of sentence 
D J?ase continued to 
GT l . Fine S <3(?f> and 3Q days in jail. 5 ffrf) 
• 2. Fine S and days in jail. $ 
3. FineS and days in jail. 5 D 
D 
• 
• 
^3L Fine to be paid on or before. 
(or) monthly payments of $ _ 
Defendant to pay: D 
Victim restitution 5 _ 
Other S 
Victim reparation 
D Alcohol rehabilitation $ 
for imposition/sentence/entry of plea 
, of fine and 3^7 ja i l suspended on cond. of probation/or fine pymt 
. of fine and jail suspended on cond. of probation/oj^iiwe-pyrat 
. of fine and jail suspended on cond. of probation/jbrfine pymt 
. D Drug testing 
. D Drug preventoj 
. D Total Amoun# //^ 
. to begin 
(or) as instructed by Adult Probation and Parole. 
PROBATION: , 
. S Defendant to be on probation for ^ months with Q AP&P QvCourt [^Unsupervised 
Defendant to report immediatelty tot 
D Probation oii'ice, 150 East Center Street, Provo 374-7633 
Review date • Presentence 
100 East Center, Suite 3200, Provo, Utah 370-8427 
• 
• 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
Utah County Department oi Substance Abuse 
Defendant to obtain an alcohol evaluation 
Defendant is to complete classes as recommended 
Defendant is to pay Utah County Substance Abuse directly 
Utah State Fund to pay for evaluation/classes 
COMMITMENT: issued for days. To be served by 
WORK RELEASE: 
by 
.in Utah County Jail 
Defendant mav serve 
Contact: ACS Director, 150 last Center Street, Provo, 374-7633 
1775 South Dakota Lane, Pro' 
hours community servi< 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
&r*srA. DEPARTMENT 
LOG SHEET/MINUTE ENTRY 
Case Number _ 
Tape ffW* - / - ? 3 Clerk fcOfcfr 
Date X, r ? - / Q - ^ L 
/wrfi 
^r/P 
LWgf L .ee^ 
Defend ^ ak 
Counter # 
Judge. 
Pit. Counsel / / £ < . y ' z i ^ / p / s C j Z ? ^ 
Def. Counsel : ^ < ^ A j> 
Offense fttjrful ^fkU^ _ 
Proceedings 
2 / ^ / ,flAg<] «W- f.iAttfL/ Jt^jJtf XXdJ, . ^ / / 4 V / ^ A ^ x ^ ?T7 ,—, • ——r-7 
Cr^r ~^Jt«d? txj,,t*&L< faffeA^ .. (***« %^< ^  
/ H l\ JS-CCis^ s ch / P.^riEr*^ . 
-J 
ST?/ c •UJJP.V?..-,;? ^ - . f A . y v ? ^ ^ / . 1 2-& 
U^O tt.'Uf.., JJLL/LJJ- - /??/ ,>, ** - ^2T7^/, • y - , # £ w f face* -
4S7 Ssyl./ J y^_3 {**>r> 
/C..N ItZ, C^f^U^ J%,.^ _S )W'Z"A zs _2____. < _ l _ _ £ ^ - c ^ a 
//$5" ljsJ,.*>t.<U2S PA/XIA / 
/^4r ZZ/ ^ * jo s?££^ //.4 / . ^ - ^ r/^/ad,. @sf[ , 
no? 
——— 
ijfrl-r rW . C^*~*<^> <r 
I^L*H o -z__________ /^r £3 
1 Ll^h 
___ 
J3£: 
__L 
3?fc UU/ a^af.cy^sc^ 
<rrf 
c* S'/sQ 
cr 
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IN THE COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF Orem, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KOTUNG LEE, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY - NOTICE 
Date: MARCH 10, 1992 
Case No: 921000023 MC 
Judge: Joseph I. Dimick 
Clerk: RUTH D HUISH 
Tape: 92123 Count: 121 
BENCH TRIAL 
This case is before the court for TRIAL on the charge of 
(1) RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) (Class B Misdemeanor) 
Appearing for the State is DON MCCANDLESS. The defendant is 
present. Appearing as counsel for the defendant is RANDY LISH. 
The defendant waives the right to be sentenced at the time 
prescribed by statute. 1 
B7 
Orem Dept. - 4th Circuit Court 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF OREM CITY 
VS 
LEE, KOTUNG 
433 WEST 165 SOUTH 
OREM UT 84058 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
CASE NO: 921000023 
DOB: 08/15/49 
TAPE: COUNT: 
DATE: 03/10/92 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 76-6-602 RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Bench 
Fine: 200.00 Susp: 100.00 
Jail: 30 DA Susp: 30 DA ACS: 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS! 
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
Fine Description: Surcharge - 85% 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS: 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Due: 
Due: 
Due: 
80.00 
20.00 
100.00 
CALENDAR: 
TRIAL 03/10/92 11:00 AM in rm 1 with Joseph I. Dimick 
DOCKET INFORMATION: 
Chrg: RETAIL THEFT Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Be 
Fine Amount: 200.00 Suspended: 100.00 
Jail: 30 DAYS Suspended: 30 DAYS 
JID:RDH, DEF PRESENT WITH RANDY LISH. MCCANDLESS PRESENT FOR 
CITY. CITY CALLS TWO WITNESSES. DEFENSE CROSS OF EACH. DEFENSE 
CALLS DEFENDANT AS WITNESS. CITY CROSS. DEFENSE ARGUMENTS. CITY 
REBUTTEL. RULLING: GUILTY AS CHARGED. TO FORFEIT BAIL IN 
DISPOSITION. BALANCE TO BE RETURNED. EXHIBIT #1 MAY BE RETURNED 
TO KMART AFTER 30 DAYS. CAULK GUN ORDERED RETURNED. 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN: 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. 
THE COURT 
fs /SAs > ^<JLO&>£J 
, CIRCUIT COURT 
